The conservation and management of wild populations and ecosystems almost always involves 1 making decisions in the face of uncertainty and risk. The application of science to the ecological 2 decision-making process was something that the late Professor Daniel Goodman thought 3 deeply about. In this paper we outline the three main principles that Dr. Goodman espoused for 4 good practice when conducting analyses for ecological decision-making: 1) the results should be 5 conditioned on all relevant data and information, 2) there must be a full characterization of all 6 uncertainty, and it should be fully propagated into the result, and 3) doing so in the correct way 7 will result in the calculation of an accurate probability distribution (conditioned on our 8 understanding of the state of nature) that should be used directly for ecological decision-9 making. Dr. Goodman believed that in the context of threatened and endangered species 10 management Population Viability Analysis (PVA), Bayesian statistics, and structured decision-11 making are the most logical tools to achieve the three principles. To illustrate the application of 12 the principles and tools in a real management setting, we discuss a Bayesian PVA that Dr. 13
INTRODUCTION 21
The conservation and management of species almost always involves making decisions 22 based on limited information. We often do not know with precision, for example, the current 23 state of the species we need to manage, we may not know what factors influence its dynamics, 24
and often, we have limited knowledge of the species' recent or long-term past that brought it 25 to its current state. Similarly, the impact of potential management actions on a species and 26 future environmental conditions cannot be known with certainty. Because of these 27 uncertainties and the potential for negative outcomes if we get the management decisions 28 wrong, species management and conservation involve risk. Such risks may include failing to 29 arrest a species' decline, causing harm to other non-target species, spending limited financial 30 and personnel resources on ineffectual actions, or unnecessarily limiting exploitation or other 31 human activity associated with the species or its habitat. Despite these uncertainties and risks, 32 management decisions must be made. How to make these decisions in an optimal way 33 regardless of the quality or quantity of information available is clearly in the purview of the field 34 of risk analysis and management. Rarely, however, is on-the-ground ecological management 35 and decision-making approached from the perspective of risk analysis and management (1) .
36
The late Professor Daniel Goodman spent a great deal of his career on this question of 37 optimal use of information for ecological decision-making, and strongly advocated for 38 addressing decisions from a risk-focused perspective. He believed that the key to effective 39 conservation of vulnerable species and other ecological decision-making lay in accurate 40 estimation of the risk to a species coupled with structured decision-making that facilitated a 41 transparent decision-making process and clear separation of scientific and policy questions. In 42 4 this paper we describe the three main principles that Dr. Goodman advocated when making 43 ecological decisions and the tools he believed were necessary to achieve these principles, 44 namely, Population Viability Analysis (PVA), Bayesian statistics, and formal decision analysis. We 45 also briefly discuss how Goodman applied these principles in a contentious management 46 situation. Throughout the paper we focus primarily on threatened and endangered species 47 management under the US Endangered Species Act (ESA), but the concepts we present are 48 relevant to all ecological decision-making arenas in and outside of the US. 49
BACKGROUND ON ESA AND PVA 50
Goodman was an applied ecologist. He described his primary professional interest as 51 the "application of modeling and statistics to actual environmental decision-making" (2) . Much 52 of his applied worked involved ESA-related decision-making, including listing (placing a species 53 on the endangered species list) and delisting (removing the species from the list) decisions. 54
According to the law, listing of a species under the ESA is an indication that the species is "in 55 danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range" (endangered), or is at 56 risk of becoming endangered "within the foreseeable future" (threatened). Listing affords the 57 species protective status under the law and may result in restrictions on human activity (e.g., 58
land development, harvest, resource extraction). Once a species is listed under the ESA, the 59 agency tasked with managing it (US Fish and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries 60 Service; collectively, the services) is required to develop a recovery plan that outlines how the 61 agency proposes to recover the species so that it no longer requires the special protective 62 measures of the ESA. The plan is required to contain "objective, measurable criteria" (recovery 63 criteria) that define when a species is no longer at risk of extinction and can be considered for 64 delisting (16 U.S.C. §1533). Actual delisting can occur presumably (but not necessarily) after the 65 recovery criteria are met and a delisting assessment shows that the species is no longer 66 threatened or endangered and that the five threat factors identified in the ESA (i.e., habitat 67 destruction, overutilization, disease or predation, inadequate regulation, or other factors) have 68 been ameliorated. While the overall intent of the ESA to protect and restore at-risk species is 69 clear, much of the language in the law is general rather than specific (3) (4) (5) , leaving decision-70 makers with the difficult task of interpreting the law and deciding exactly what is meant by 71 phrases like "in danger of", "significant portion of", and "foreseeable future". As a result, a 72 great deal of variation exists in the approaches used to evaluate a species' standing under the 73 ESA, including how recovery criteria are formulated and listing and delisting decisions are made 74
by the services (6) (7) (8) 
75
One approach to evaluating whether a species should be listed or delisted under the 76 ESA is Population Viability Analysis (PVA). PVA is a term that encompasses a wide range of 77 quantitative techniques designed to predict the future status of a population or species (9) . 78
Generally, a PVA uses information about a species' past population dynamics to project possible 79 future scenarios through stochastic simulation modeling. One result of a PVA is an estimate of a 80 population's risk of extinction or quasi-extinction (i.e., falling below some designated threshold) 81 over a specified timeframe. 82
PVAs have an intuitive appeal with respect to ESA-related decisions since they provide an 83 estimate of extinction risk, the very metric identified in the ESA as defining threatened and endangered 84 species. Despite this, their use in making management decisions, especially in the context of the ESA,
85
has been vigorously debated. Some have argued that in the context of management decisions PVAs are 6 too unreliable when data are poor, require too much data to be of use in endangered species listing 87 decisions when data are often limited, or are too imprecise to be useful (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) . Others have countered
88
that their usefulness outweighs their limitations, that alternative approaches for ESA decision-making 89 have more significant drawbacks, and that many of the perceived weaknesses of PVA can be addressed 90 with careful application and consideration of uncertainty (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) . This latter view was embraced 91 completely and authoritatively by Goodman. He suggested that a PVA model was the only 92 approach that could use and synthesize all of the available data, which was a highly desirable, 93 and even obligatory, property. More specifically, he advocated for use of Bayesian statistics 94 within the PVA framework, and for the results of the Bayesian PVA to be used in a structured 95 decision-making context. 96
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ECOLOGICAL DECISION-MAKING 97
Goodman's advocacy for Bayesian PVA and structured decision-making was predicated 98 on three fundamental principles for good practices in analyses used for ecological decision-99 making: 1) the results of the analysis should be conditioned on all available data, 2) all 100 uncertainty should be accounted for and fully propagated into the result, and 3) the calculated 101 results should be directly used for ecological decision-making. Goodman argued that if the first 102 two principles were followed in the correct way, one could calculate a correct probability 103 distribution for the state of nature given the available information and the uncertainty. It then 104 follows that the correct probability could be used directly in structured decision-making process 105 to arrive at a decision fully consistent with the decision-maker's values, the data, and the 106 uncertainty. We will step through these points in detail, and discuss their specific application to 107 endangered species listing and delisting decisions. 
Use all the data 109
The first guiding principle is that a scientific analysis that will be used for ecological 110 decision-making should be conditioned on all the relevant data (not just some of it), and to the 111 extent possible, only on the relevant data. In the context of species management, "relevant" 112 means only those data that will impact the future dynamics of the species (26) .
Specifically, 113
Goodman advocated using all the data in a synthetic analysis rather than performing multiple 114 separate analyses of different kinds of data that are separately considered for the decision, or 115 integrated via "human integration" (i.e., people viewing the separate results and subjectively 116 deciding what they mean in total). The non-synthetic approach is by far the most common 117 approach to ESA listing and delisting decisions and generally requires less time and fewer 118 resources than a fully quantitative synthesis approach. But as Goodman and others have 119 argued, mathematical models that integrate all data reinforce an internal logic and consistency 120 that can often be missing when separate models and ad hoc integration are used (23, 17, 27) .
121
PVA provides precisely the type of synthetic analysis that Goodman promoted. "Using 122 all the data" in a PVA means, as a start, including information on population size, population 123 trend, sources of human-caused mortality, and life history information such as birth and death 124 rates. However, it can also include data on such things as environmental forcing, variability of 125 prey and/or natural survival rates, probability of catastrophic events, and likely future 126 management or threat scenarios. Given the different types of data and the different temporal 127 and spatial scales encompassed by such comprehensive inclusion of data, this principle of using 128 all the data is rarely easy in practice. Fortunately, the increasing use of "integrated" population 129 models (28-32) reflects a trend toward this type of synthetic analyses and has led to increased 130 accessibility of techniques and tools for using a wide variety of data within a single analysis. 131
Include all sources of uncertainty 132
Using all available information may seem to have an obvious interpretation, but what 133 may not be as obvious is that "information" includes not only what we know but also what we 134 don't know, i.e., the "known, unknowns", as Donald Rumsfeld would say (33) . This brings us to 135
Goodman's second guiding principle, incorporate all sources of uncertainty. An emphasis on 136 incorporating uncertainty has been a long-running theme in conservation biology and 137 environmental management. This is exemplified, for example, in a symposium and Special 138
Section in the journal Conservation Biology in 2000 titled "Better Policy and Management 139
Decisions through Explicit Analysis of Uncertainty: New Approaches from Marine 140 Conservation". Goodman was not the only person advocating a better and more thorough 141 handling of uncertainty in analyses, but he was an early advocate, and perhaps embraced the 142 concept more thoroughly and emphatically than others. Although Goodman did not have a 143 paper in the Conservation Biology special section, his influence can be seen in the number of his 144 graduate students (or even second-generation graduate students) who did (34) (35) (36) (37) . 145
What does it mean to more fully incorporate uncertainty? One way to view it is through 146 the development of applied statistical and modeling practices in ecology. This is an over-147 simplification, but there has been a progression in applied statistics in incorporating more 148 uncertainty over the last few decades. Though it likely has always made statisticians cringe, 149 there used to be many examples of ecological decision-making based solely on point estimates 150 of parameters (e.g., the population is declining at 2.3% per year). That simplistic approach can 151 9 be viewed as step 1 in the progress toward incorporating more uncertainty.
Step 2 was to fully 152 incorporate parameter uncertainty (e.g., the population is declining at 2.3% per year with 153 standard error of 1.1%). Although this sounds easy and straight-forward, for complex models 154 this was not always simple, and new statistical techniques were developed to accomplish this, 155 such as the jackknife or bootstrap in frequentist statistics (38, 39) , or numerical integration 156 techniques in Bayesian statistics such as sampling importance resampling (SIR) or Markov Chain 157
Monte Carlo (MCMC) (40) . 158
Step 3 in the evolution of statistically valid approaches to uncertainty was the 159 widespread use of more complex models in ecology, whether for abundance estimation (e.g., 160
mark-recapture or line-transect analysis) or for population modeling. In particular, for PVA 161 models there was clearly the need to incorporate the uncertainty that arises from stochastic 162 processes (e.g., rather than declining at the same rate every year, the population can 163 experience small declines in some years and larger declines in other years). Statisticians speak 164 of uncertainty in terms of error, and stochastic processes are viewed as "process error" as 165 opposed to "estimation error", which arises from uncertainty in the exact value of the model 166 parameters. Treatment of these two types of error becomes important in PVA models, and 167 their treatment can be viewed as being different in Bayesian statistics than it is in classical 168 frequentist statistics (see Gerrodette et al. in this volume for more on this topic). Goodman was 169 firmly in the Bayesian camp regarding the treatment of these two sources of error, and made 170 convincing arguments for his point of view (27, 41) .
171
The development of more complex and sophisticated models in ecology has mostly 172 been a good thing, but it came at a cost, which can be viewed as Step 4. The complexity in 173 newer ecological models lead to more model choices and to a greater uncertainty about which 174 model was the "best" one (e.g., does a model with a single rate of decline fit the data better 175 than a change-point model with two different rates of decline?). To choose, we needed a solid 176 statistical method for deciding which model fits the data better. Although step-wise likelihood 177 ratio tests for model selection had been around for a long time, better techniques were 178 needed, particularly to compare non-nested models. This has led to the relatively recent move 179 to fully embrace model uncertainty in ecological analyses, in addition to parameter uncertainty. 180
Again, this development occurred on both sides of the statistical de-militarized zone (classical 181 frequentist vs. Bayesian), with AIC, championed by Burnham et al. (42) , gaining widespread 182 usage for non-Bayesians, and Bayes Factors (43) 
and the BIC (as an approximation for the Bayes 183
Factor) (44) , gaining widespread usage by Bayesian statisticians. Each side took the model 184 selection one step further with a subtle refinement, where rather than choosing a single model, 185
we average our result across the best-fitting models, either through AIC or Bayesian model-186 averaging methods (45) . 187
Interestingly, Goodman did not seem too keen on model selection methods. He 188 identified model selection as a legitimate source of uncertainty, but to deal with it he 189 advocated the use of flexible models that, when fit to data, could encompass a wide variety of 190 realities (41) . He acknowledged however, that such an approach comes at the cost of increasing 191 parameter uncertainty (i.e., the model uncertainty is folded into the parameter uncertainty 192 when a flexible model is used that increases the scope or number of parameters). He felt that 193 this was an acceptable cost, and perhaps was preferable, because all uncertainty continued to 194 be incorporated (though potentially misallocated) and could be propagated through to the 195 results and did not necessitate procedures external to the primary model (41) . This point of view 196 is at odds with much of the mainstream of recent ecological analysis methods, but perhaps 197 speaks to his view that if you worked from first principles in a correct and thorough way, then 198 applied a "rich enough model", you would get the correct answer, including a full 199 characterization of uncertainty, and thus implicitly have no need for model selection. 200
Besides the developments in statistical methodology, there was also a related 201 philosophical development in how we view ecological models. Perhaps the best way to view 202 this is by looking at models that extrapolate into the future, such as PVA models. Do we assume 203 that the world will stay the same as it is now, or do we allow for the possibility that the world 204 may change, and with it, some of the basic assumptions that go into our models? For example, 205 do we assume that carrying capacity in a projection model is constant, or do we allow for a 206 future change in carrying capacity? These types of questions have become increasingly 207 important as we struggle to deal with issues such as climate change in our models. Goodman 208 strongly opposed using PVA simply "to replay the recent past as a stochastic simulation" (26) . He 209 argued that the observed past is only a sample of potential environmental variability and that 210 blind extrapolation of past trends related to human impact, as one example, may not be 211 justified. Issues of uncertainty related to future conditions are extremely difficult to deal with, 212 but it is in these types of uncertainties where Goodman's advocacy for the full incorporation of 213 uncertainty strikes the starkest contrast to other approaches. He did not simply pay lip service 214 to uncertainty as a "qualitative pejorative", but insisted that all uncertainty be quantified 215 including the future unknown (41) .
While not yet regularly employed in PVA, some researchers 216 are beginning to address both subtle and severe uncertainty related to process ambiguity, rare 217 events, or future unknowns (but not always in a Bayesian context) (23, (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) 31) . 218
Apply the true probability distribution to decisions 219
So how does one accomplish the goal of quantifying all the uncertainty and using all the 220 data, and how does that lead to Goodman's third principle of calculating a true probability 221 distribution and using that distribution directly in decision-making? The short answer, in 222
Goodman's view, is to be a Bayesian with data. Bayesian methods require the use of a 223 probability distribution (the "prior") for the parameter that is specified a priori (essentially, 224 before the data are used). According to Goodman, this prior probability distribution must 225 contain a full characterization of the uncertainty and knowledge we have about the parameter 226 prior to our analysis. By combining this prior that quantifies our full state of ignorance and 227 information about the parameters with a flexible model that incorporates the uncertainty in 228 the model structure, then bringing in the data via the likelihood function, Goodman argued that 229 all relevant information and uncertainty can be analyzed in a single synthetic framework. Using 230 this Bayesian approach, the mathematical combination of the prior and the data (via the 231 likelihood) results in a posterior distribution that can be directly interpreted as a probability 232 distribution for the parameter. Importantly, you can also directly and easily calculate a 233 probability distribution for any function of the parameters. This is very different than what you 234 get from a classical frequentist analysis, which results in a point estimate, and possibly, 235 confidence intervals around the point estimate. 236
Numerical computation developments such as MCMC can be applied to either 237 maximum likelihood estimation or Bayesian statistics, so to a certain extent the ability to more 238 fully incorporate uncertainty has happened across all types of statistics, not just in the Bayesian 239 paradigm. From a technical point of view, there is one significant advantage of Bayesian 240 methods -we can use hierarchical models, such as random effects models, which is not 241 possible in frequentist statistics without using ad hoc estimation methods (51) .
The difference in interpretation between a Bayesian analysis and frequentist analysis 247 becomes substantial when a stochastic model is used, such as in a PVA. Regardless of the 248 statistical framework, any stochastic model will yield a distribution for the probability of the 249 event of interest simply due to the stochastic processes in the model. So even if all the PVA 250 parameters are fixed at a single value, as in the frequentist paradigm, the result will be a 251 distribution for the probability of extinction, i.e., there might be some probability the 252 population goes extinct in 50 years as well as some probability the population goes extinct in 253 100 years. Using this type of frequentist approach, if you change the values of the fixed 254 parameters, you will get a different distribution of extinction times. In contrast, a Bayesian 255 analysis will give you a single distribution for the probability of extinction that integrates across 256 all possible values of the parameters, and from which you can obtain a probability of extinction 257 in 100 years or 50 years, or 2 years. , where he notes that one Bayesian interpretation of a probability distribution is that it 269 represents subjective belief -this concept arises when one interprets the prior distribution as 270 summarizing one's subjective belief about what the value of the parameter is, before the data. 271
Goodman explicitly rejected this interpretation, and instead argued that the prior distribution 272
should be based on empirical information, including auxiliary data relevant to your case, or 273 even comparative data from a family of similar cases. With such data-based prior distributions, 274
Goodman argued that the posterior distribution represented an actual probability distribution 275
for what the value of the parameter could be, and that it was not subjective: 276
"This program of sequential application of Bayes' formula to combine different 277 kinds of available case-specific data, and available comparative data, allows use 278 of the mathematical machinery of Bayesian statistics, without running aground 279
on the rocks of subjective probability." (26) 
280
This focus on making the prior distribution empirical led Goodman to perhaps think 281 more deeply about the construction of prior distributions than others have, and it can be 282 argued this was one of his main contributions to ecological risk assessment and Bayesian 283 statistics. In fact, he devoted an entire paper to the subject titled "Taking the prior seriously: 284 Bayesian analysis without subjective probability." (52) In that paper he discusses the details of 285 basing a prior distribution on comparative data from other cases, and how to use hierarchical 286 Bayesian modeling to create such priors. In another paper, he continued this theme and 287 explicitly described how PVAs should be based on hierarchical Bayesian methods, with 288 empirical priors established from suites of populations.
(27) He also reiterated that using such 289 methods results in the correct answer, meaning the posterior distribution for the probability of 290 extinction represents an absolute probability of extinction, not a relative probability of 291 extinction. To make this point clear, he notes that if one had 100 different populations for 292 which you had calculated a 3% probability of extinction in 100 years, your expectation would be 293 that three of the populations would actually go extinct in 100 years. (27) 
294
These core principles Goodman was applying to ecological decisions, and PVAs in 295 particular, directly addressed two of the core debates in the PVA literature which are related: 296
(1) Are PVAs useful, and (2) can PVAs provide an absolute probability of extinction? PVAs often 297 (necessarily) require one to make several assumptions about the dynamics of small 298 populations, for which few data are available. Early on in the development and assessment of 299 PVA models it was noted that relatively small differences in inputs could lead to large 300 differences in the results (53) , and it was argued that PVAs are potentially unreliable.
(54, 10) Others 301 noted the precision of PVAs were unlikely to be sufficient to make PVAs useful. (11, 13, 14) The 302 interpretation of the probability of extinction as absolute versus relative has also been one of 303 the core debates of the PVA field. In a seminal paper in the field, Beissinger and Westphal (12) argue PVAs are unreliable for a variety of reasons, such as difficulties in estimating variance and 305 not capturing environmental trends and fluctuations properly. They recommended that PVAs 306 should only be used as relative estimates of extinction risk, such as for weighing management 307 alternatives to reduce extinction risk. In contrast, Goodman firmly believed that the sequence 308 of conditioning on all the data, incorporating all sources of uncertainty, and forming a 309 probability distribution for the parameter of interest was the correct way to use science to 310 make ecological decisions. 311
"Such analyses provide the best legitimate inference that can be extracted from 312 the available information. The inference is best in the sense that the distribution 313 is true, and the distribution is as narrow as can be achieved with the 314 information." (41)

315
Goodman was not alone in his beliefs. It is not that scientists who believe PVAs are 316 useful do not understand these important issues of the precision of the results, the influence of 317 small changes in inputs, or the possible reliance on untested assumptions or inadequate data. 318
Instead, they (and we) argue there is no better summation of what is known about extinction 319 risk for a species than a properly done PVA, and if there is a lot of uncertainty in the answer, 320 this is an accurate assessment of the state of our knowledge, and decision-makers need to fully 321 take account of this, i.e., it is part of the risk. PVA advocates also point out that the alternatives, 322 such as using proxies for extinction risk (e.g., small population size and/or declining trend) or 323 qualitatively assessing extinction risk, are worse (55) and represent less rigorous and quantitative 324 uses of the same data that are input into the PVA. This view is perhaps most eloquently 325 expressed by Brook et al. (17) , in response to the widely held view that in circumstances where 326 data are sparse or of low quality PVAs have little useful predictive value and should be 327 dispensed with in favor of "alternative methods": 328 
334
It is interesting to point out that one of the best arguments in support of this view that PVAs 335 are the correct and best tool to use for making decisions about extinction risk has come from 336 empirical tests, where it has been shown through the use of retrospective analysis of case 337 studies that predictions of PVAs can be reliable. by Dr. Bob Small to develop a PVA for the SSL populations, the western portion of which had 341 declined by more than 80% and was listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act. 342
The recovery team was tasked with revising the original recovery plan that had been developed 343 in 1992, and to devise new recovery criteria. The intention of the recovery team was to use the 344 results of Goodman's PVA to develop these revised recovery criteria. 345
Given the principles that Goodman espoused in his writing, it is worth examining 346 whether he was able to put those principles into practice while developing the SSL PVA. The 347 information we present below draws heavily from the Steller sea lion recovery plan containing 348
Goodman's final PVA report as an appendix (57) , but also from personal communications with 349
Bob Small, discussions with Goodman, and Goodman's personal files. Overall we found that he 350 applied his general principles but not always in the idealized way he had proposed. 351
Background 352
To understand Goodman It was in this context that Goodman began work on the SSL PVA. Consistent with the 366 principles outlined above, his aim was to develop a Bayesian PVA within a decision theory 367 framework. His strategy was to take the descriptive narrative that the recovery team developed 368 for the recovery plan, including the historic declines, the current threats, uncertainty about 369 unexplained dynamics, and the recovery team's definition of a recovered population, and turn 370 them into a synthetic quantitative model that would be logically consistent with respect to the 371 empirical data, the policy determinations and expert opinion provided by the recovery team, 372 and the uncertainty inherent in the system and process. Using this approach, he hoped to not 373 only provide internal coherence between the PVA, the recovery plan narrative, and the 374 recovery criteria, but also transparency and reduced ambiguity in the recovery plan and criteria 375 to render them technically and legally defensible under the ESA. 376
PVA Model Development: Principles vs. Reality 377
Some of the first decisions Goodman asked the PVA subgroup of the recovery team to 378 make were about policy elements that are not defined precisely in the ESA. First they defined in 379 quantitative terms the extinction risk level that defined the boundary between endangered and 380 threatened. In other words Goodman asked the subgroup to make a policy judgment that 381 quantified the ESA's threshold of "in danger of extinction". The subgroup opted for <1% 382 extinction risk in 100 years, a value recommended by some (59) and used in other recovery plans 383 (25) . Second, Goodman asked the subgroup to more precisely define whether "extinction" meant 384 absolute extinction (zero animals left), or some version of functional-or quasi-extinction. The 385 subgroup decided to use a quasi-extinction level defined by a genetically effective population 386 size (60) of 1,000. In this way, Goodman clearly isolated the policy questions from the modeling 387
questions. 388
Once the policy questions were settled, Goodman began the process of building the 389 (external factors) used to adjust the net (or realized) growth rates (Fig. 1) , but the PVA 411 subgroup was unable to find data to support more than minimum estimates. Because of this 412 lack of full quantification of uncertainty, Goodman suggested in his PVA report that the 413 uncertainty in the full impact of external factors "must be borne in mind when interpreting the 414 results" of the his model (57) . Obviously this falls short of a full quantitative rendering of all 415 sources of uncertainty. 416
Goodman also used conventional vague priors for the Bayesian portion of his model. 417
Since he did not explain his decision to do so, we are left to guess at his reasoning. Pragmatic 418 considerations likely determined the decision, whether it was time limitations or data 419 limitations or both. Regardless of the reason, the vague priors yielded posterior distributions 420 carrying the maximal uncertainty present in the data and reflects a more pragmatic approach 421 than is present in Goodman's philosophical writing. 422
Goodman did incorporate some level of model uncertainty in his approach to dealing 423 with the unexplained dynamics that have impacted the western SSL population historically and 424 how they might impact the population in the future. To deal with this aspect of uncertainty, 425
following development of his model, Goodman conceived of three alternative hypotheses 426 about how future SSL growth rates would operate. He asked the PVA subgroup to provide an 427 estimate, based on expert opinion, of the probability that his PVA model assumptions were 428 correct versus the three alternative hypotheses. If formalized into alternative PVA models, all 429 three alternative hypotheses would result in 0% probability of extinction in 100 years under any 430 conceivable management scenario. Thus, Goodman used the PVA subgroup's expert opinion 431 regarding the probability of his "base" model being correct to perform a sort of model 432 averaging. His approach was unconventional compared to other model selection approaches, 433 but it was consistent with his principle of considering all the relevant information and 434 uncertainty and was also consistent with the principle of using PVA and structured decision-435 and that they appropriately reflected the high degree of uncertainty in both the historical 458 dynamics of the population and its future prospects. With these "correct" PVA results in hand, 459
Goodman spent a considerable amount of time in writing and in meetings explaining how the 460 results could be used to arrive at recovery criteria that appropriately reflected those results. He 461 also laid out a long-term plan for continuing to update the PVA as more data became available 462 to potentially reduce the uncertainty in the model and reduce the estimated time to recovery. 463
The recovery team used Goodman's PVA results to formulate recovery criteria for the 464 SSL western DPS, but because of the wide posterior distribution from Goodman's PVA, the 465 timeframe for recovery was far into the future. As Goodman argued, this was the "correct" 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 473
Dr. Goodman championed three main principles for achieving transparent and 474 scientifically based ecological decision making: using all available data, exhaustively quantifying 475 uncertainties, and using a synthetic analysis to arrive at a result, complete with uncertainty, 476 that can be used directly in the decision-making process. Mechanistically, Goodman believed 477 that the best way to adhere to these principles in the context of species management was to 478 use Bayesian PVA and structured decision-making. The Bayesian aspect is necessary because 479 (inappropriately) to the science side. In reality, scientific models such as PVA, require both 502 policy determinations (e.g., should "endangered" be defined as having an extinction risk of 5% 503 in 100 years or 1% in 200 years or…) as well as scientific determinations (e.g., what kind of 504 demographic model should be used and should it include density dependence). Other model 505 inputs may also require a combination of scientific data and best guesses that will require input 506 from both scientists and managers (e.g., to what degree will human activities impact future 507 populations). Scientific models should therefore not be viewed purely as scientific endeavors 508 but as collaborative efforts between decision-makers and scientists. 509
In Goodman's SSL PVA example, he was able to achieve buy-in from the scientific PVA 510 sub-group, and eventually the entire SSL recovery team, through extensive communication and 511 education about statistical fundamentals and the process and logic he used to develop his 512 model. He also clearly outlined which aspects of the model were policy questions to be 513 answered by the team, which aspects were expert opinion, and which aspects were purely 514 scientific questions to be resolved by data. His work in this area provided an excellent 515 foundation and justification for the scientific analyses that were performed as well as an 516 example of how good communication can bring about consensus on model inputs. However, 517 once the draft recovery plan was submitted to agency decision-makers and reviewed by others 518 outside the recovery team, the buy-in from the recovery team held little currency. So unless the 519 management context is relatively uncontroversial or communication and buy-in can be 520 achieved throughout all levels of management so that the final decision-makers have input into 521 policy relevant aspects of the model, then the rigorous application of a structured decision 522 making process is likely not fully achievable. 523
So are we to throw up our hands in despair? We do not think so. We believe that the 524 three principles and the tools to achieve them should be used to the maximum extent 525 practicable, with the understanding that, at times, pragmatism may have to win out (e.g., fully 526 empirically based Bayesian priors may not be achievable), but that the principles can be 527 followed in spirit if not always to the letter. We believe that this is what Goodman did in his SSL 528 PVA. Following these principles will, at the least, render the science portion of the process fully 529 transparent and documented for all stakeholders. Beyond the science, communication between 530 scientists and managers is clearly a critical component of the process as is clarity on all sides 531 about which aspects of model-building are policy determinations and which are scientific 532 questions. We also believe, as Goodman did, that the road to better ecological decision-making 533 is a long one that will require incremental progress. Perhaps Goodman's principles provide us 534 with a picture of the ideal scenario toward which we should strive. 535 536
